Reducing the Risks and Realizing the
Rewards: An Approach to Teaching
Rape Law

KEVIN C. McMUNIGAL*

The perceived risks of teaching the law of rape exclude it from many
American law school classrooms. Those risks, explored in recent essays
by Professors James Tomkovicz 1 and Susan Estrich, 2 are real and
substantial. The subject of rape elicits strong emotional responses from
both male and female students across the political spectrum, creating a
number of classroom hazards. The dialogue may become so volatile that
the instructor loses control of the classroom and what some have
described as a classroom "explosion" occurs. 3 The class may polarize
along gender lines, with students and the professor feeling alienated,
silenced, misunderstood, or damaged by what went on in the classroom.
Openness to dialogue may shut down and a constructive learning
atmosphere may be lost.
But the rewards of teaching rape law are also real and substantial. The
emotive power of the subject makes for compelling and engaging
classes. Rape law provides an excellent vehicle for illuminating the
principles and theories of criminal law in a current and vital context.

* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I am grateful to Kate
Bloch, Richard Fox, Catherine Hancock, Bernadette McSherry, Eileen Scanlon, and
James Tomkovicz for comments.
1. James J. Tomkovicz, On Teaching Rape: Reasons, Risks, and Rewards, 102
YALE L.J. 481 (1992).
2. Susan Estrich, Teaching Rape Law, 102 YALE L.J. 509 (1992).
3. See Kate E. Bloch, A Rape Law Pedagogy, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307, 312
(1995); Estrich, supra note 2, at 515.
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Moreover, if one succeeds in containing the risks the subject presents,
the classes provide a valuable model for constructive exchange and
debate on other emotionally charged topics.
How, then, is a criminal law teacher to meet the challenges this
subject poses? How does one reduce the risks and realize the rewards
of teaching rape law? Professor Kate Bloch recently advanced one
possible answer to these questions: her "student-as-legislator" method. 4
Professor Bloch uses a fairly elaborate role play in which the class
functions as a legislature charged with drafting a statutory scheme to
criminalize rape. Rather than talk abstractly about possible legislative
schemes, individual students draft statutes and then attempt to persuade
the 'legislature' to enact their proposals. In the course of these mock
legislative sessions, students use visual aids to compare and contrast the
various statutory proposals. The special advantages of role play in this
context are that it increases distance and provides incentives which
mitigate the risks of explosion and alienation.
Professor Bloch's thoughtful article provides many useful ideas, a
number of which I have put to use teaching rape law in my criminal law
course. It also has prompted me to share my own approach to the
subject. Although my primary focus is on how, not whether, to teach
rape law, the view which underlies my comments is that rape is an
excellent subject for first year criminal law.
When I first started teaching criminal law, I was interested in teaching
rape law but uncertain how to go about it. That uncertainty in effect
excluded rape from my course. A 1987 presentation by Professor
Catherine Hancock5 nudged me beyond this hesitancy by suggesting an
approach which would help contain the risks and realize the rewards of
including rape law in a first year criminal law class. Since that time, I
have included rape in most of my criminal law courses. My experience
in teaching rape law has varied from year to year and has included close
encounters with its dangers. Generally, however, I have found it a very
positive experience and I count some of my classes on rape among the
most rewarding I have taught in criminal law. I write this article to
strengthen the case for teaching rape law by contributing to the
discussion of techniques which will reduce its risks and magnify its
rewards.
The approach I have used is a combination of ideas pirated from
others and ideas of my own. An important preliminary issue is the

4. Bloch, supra note 3, at 314.
5. Catherine Hancock, "A Feminist Approach to Teaching Rape," a presentation
at the AALS Criminal Justice Teaching Conference in Chapel Hill, N.C., May 1987.
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question when during the semester to treat rape law. I address this in
Part I. In Parts II, III, IV, and V, I describe the three basic components
of my approach. The :first of these is to anticipate early in the course
problems likely to arise in teaching rape law and proactively to use the
material in the course which precedes the topic of rape to mitigate those
problems. My second component is a role play, similar to but less
formal than Professor Bloch's. I ask my students to address the problem
of jury nullification in rape cases from the perspectives of judges and
legislators and I ask them to formulate responses which include not only
· modifications to the substantive law of rape, but also possible evidentiary and procedural solutions. The third component is a special reading
assignment, two chapters from Susan Estrich's book, Real Rape. 6 I ask
my students to evaluate Professor Estrich's rape reform proposals in the
context of the major themes and issues they have encountered earlier in
the course.
This method reduces the risks of explosion, silencing, alienation, and
gender polarization. It also improves the chances of fully realizing rape
law's potential to illuminate fundamental themes of criminal law.
I.

WHEN IN THE SEMESTER TO TEACH RAPE LAW?

The timing of rape law coverage may at first seem insignificant, but
it has a number of important implications. Some teachers treat rape law
early in the semester. Professor Tomkovicz, for example, covers the
subject in the :fifth week. 7 The organization of the casebook both
Professor Tomkovicz and I use suggests similarly early treatment. 8 The
authors make their chapter on rape the :first devoted to treatment of
specific offenses, placing it immediately after their core introductory
material and just prior to the chapter on homicide, a traditional mainstay
of :first year criminal law.

6. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987) [hereinafter REAL RAPE].
7. Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 486.
8. The book is SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS PROCESSES (6th ed. 1995). Chapters 2 and 3 concern the justification of
punishment and the definition of criminal conduct. Chapter 4 is on rape. Chapter 5 is on
homicide. Causation, attempt, group criminality, exculpation, and theft offenses are dealt
with in later chapters.
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Professor Bloch and I, in contrast, cover rape late in the semester. 9 I
usually cover rape around the eleventh or twelfth week of a fourteen
week semester, after covering homicide. I have never experimented with
teaching it early in the semester, but my preference for late treatment has
been reinforced by my positive experience with late semester treatment
and my reading of Professor Tomkovicz's experience with early
treatment.
Several rationales favor late treatment. For one thing, the students are
in a better position to handle rape law toward the end of the semester.
In any class, students become more familiar with each other and their
instructor as the semester progresses. 10 Many schools place criminal
law in the first semester of the first year, when students are complete
strangers both to one another and the instructor. Accordingly, this
semester often yields the most marked increase in familiarity of any
semester in law school. In my experience, students who know each
other and their instructor are more comfortable and more willing to
speak. Increased familiarity mitigates the problem of students being
silenced in discussions of rape. It also increases the sense of a class as
a community, the bonds of which reduce risks of explosion and gender
polarization.
I acknowledge, though, that late treatment poses some risks.
Familiarity may at times have a negative effect, with students carrying
over to their discussion of rape the repercussions. of earlier class
discussions of other 'hot button topics' such as abortion, hate speech, or
affirmative action. 11 There is also the danger of running short on time.
Some professors, pressed to cover everything mentioned in their syllabi,
scramble at the end of the semester. Rape law is a hazardous topic to
rush through.
Students are also better prepared to handle the subject of rape toward
the end of the semester simply because they know more about criminal
law and have a firmer grasp of its principles and vocabulary than they
do early in the semester. The subject of rape magnifies the likelihood12
and negative consequences of miscommunication. The more knowledge-

9. Bloch, supra note 3, at 324.
10. Id. at 324 ("[W]hile in a rare year there is almost instant rapport among class
members and the professor, more often in my experience, genuine rapport takes time.
The existence of that rapport is fundamental to the success of the. rape law enterprise.").
11. See, e.g., Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 495 n.39 (describing the silencing of a
student in criminal law class whose "anti-abortion" position in an earlier class had been
met with "derisive laughter.").
12. See, Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 491 n.31 ("The lesson I learned was that you
can never be sure of making yourself understood in this area of law.").
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able students are about criminal law, the less likely they are to misspeak
and to misinterpret others. Although the danger of miscommunication
is always present, it is lower toward the end of the semester. The
students are also better equipped late in the semester with the knowledge
and skills needed to perform a legislative drafting exercise such as the
one used by Professor Bloch13 and the transubstantive exercise I assign
of considering evidentiary and procedural dimensions of rape law
reform.
It also makes sense to cover rape after homicide. Though homicide
law has its areas of volatility, such as the role of race in application of
the death penalty, class· discussions of the law of homicide are generally
less emotionally and politically volatile than those of rape law and
therefore subject to less risk of miscommunication. Homicide is also
less technically challenging than rape law and is therefore a better initial
vehicle for students to explore and test their mastery of criminal law's
general principles. Homicide law has some taxing complexities, such as
the nuances of the felony murder rule and the distinction between
extreme indifference murder and manslaughter, but its basic structure is
straightforward. It has one primary axis, culpability, and rarely raises
difficult definitional questions about the elements of conduct, result, or
circumstance. Rape law, in contrast, has no clear basic structure and
requires students to deal simultaneously with interdependent permutations of conduct, circumstance, and culpability. In addition, the law of
homicide is well settled, while the law of rape is in transition and has
been subject to wide experimentation and variation in recent years from
state to state. 14
First year students also become more familiar with the methods
encountered in a law school classroom as the year progresses and, again,
the familiarity curve is steepest when criminal law is one of their first
courses. Increased familiarity with and understanding of such classroom
exercises as role-playing and the articulation of positions and arguments
with which the speaker does not necessarily agree reduces the misunder-

13. Bloch, supra note 3, at 324 ("[F]or the student-as-legislator approach to serve
as a counterpoint, we must have critiqued legislative drafting.").
14. See Estrich, supra note 2, at 516 ("[N]o subject of substantive criminal law [is]
in greater ferment . . . [than] the law of rape.").
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standings which occur when students hold a speaker personally
responsible for the positions or arguments she articulates. 15
By waiting until late in the semester to cover rape, the professor gains
time to gauge the personal dynamics and level of rapport within a
particular class, to anticipate problems, and to defuse them. 16 The
instructor also gets the option of bailing out if she senses that the risks
with a particular class are too high. By handing out my criminal law
syllabus in sections during the semester, I retain the opportunity to
evaluate the progress of the class before I finally choose the material to ·
be covered toward the end of the semester. Rather than commit to
covering rape at the outset, 17 this strategy allows the instructor to make
a final decision on rape coverage after getting a feel for that year's class.
Finally, placing rape law late in the semester increases the instructor's
opportunity to use material covered earlier in the course proactively, as
discussed in the next section ..

IL

TAKING THE OFFENSIVE

Rather than wait to react when and if trouble occurs, professors can
take the offensive to avoid classroom problems in teaching rape law. 18
The topic of rape can be introduced with comments aimed explicitly at
sensitizing students to its difficulties. I often stress the challenges
presented by rape law: the powerful personal reactions it tends to evoke,
the possible presence of rape survivors in the class, and the tendency
toward gender polarization and stereotyping. I also ask students to listen
carefully to what others say before making judgments and caution them

15. Professor Tomkovicz, for example, recounts an incident in which "despite my
announcement that I would not be offering my own views on the issues at hand, a
student had 'heard' me endorse an ·'incorrect' (by modem, right-thinking standards)
position." Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 493.
16. Bloch, supra note 3, at 324 ("Observing the class and individual reactions to
[domestic violence and racism issues raised earlier in the semester] facilitates the
assessment of how, on a very detailed level, to treat rape law.").
17. See Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 484.
On day one of my visiting appointment, during the opening minutes of an
introductory lecture, I passed the point of no return in two distinct ways. From
the podium I declared that the additional hours Michigan allocated to criminal
law had provided me with an opportunity and that we all would be the
beneficiaries. I announced that ... we would be addressing the subject [of
rape]. In addition, the syllabus that was passing through the class confirmed
my intention in writing.
Id.
18. See Nancy S. Erickson, Sex Bias in Law School Courses: Some Common
Issues, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 101, 113-114 (1988) ("It is often best to take the offensive
rather than to be put on the defensive.").
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to think before they speak. 19 I have wondered, though, in recent years
whether such comments may actually increase class discomfort and
silencing.
An instructor can also be proactive about rape law issues from the
very beginning of the course, weeks before the classes specifically
dedicated to the subject. As I have already suggested, it makes sense to
cover homicide before rape. It is also helpful to use rape law to illustrate
analytical and .technical points encountered early in the course, to
highlight issues which will provide useful tie-ins during later rape
discussions and to raise rape law issues explicitly at appropriate points,
allowing limited if any discussion, but asking students to think about
them in preparation for later classes on rape when they will be discussed
in depth.
The goals here are to get students used to encountering rape law, to
aid their understanding of the technical aspects of rape law, and to
enable and encourage students to use multiple perspectives in their
approach to rape law, including but not limited to the perspective of
gender. The perspective of gender is essential in studying rape law. But
if students use only that perspective, class volatility will be greater, and
the opportunities to use rape law to explore other criminal law themes
will be diminished. One of my goals is to provide students, before they
reach rape law, with ready access to a range of viewpoints they can
bring to bear on the subject.
The very first class of the semester provides an opportunity to lay the
foundation for rape law coverage. Like many professors, I begin with
Regina v. Dudley & Stephens. 20 This classic lifeboat cannibalism case
illustrates the general purposes of punishment, the possible tensions
between them, and the complexity of applying these purposes to the
facts of a particular case. Toward the end of the first class, after
students have expressed various viewpoints and arguments on retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, I ask the students if their
views on the appropriate sanction for Dudley and Stephens would
change if, at the time the two seamen sacrificed a shipmate to save

19. For further discussion of comments used to introduce the subject ofrape law,
see Bloch, supra note 3, at 315-19; Tomkovicz, supra note l, at 486.
20. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884), reprinted in KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 7, at
131-36.
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themselves, such "survival cannibalism" was a customary practice among
the British seafaring community and widely accepted by the British
public as an appropriate response to the extreme circumstances of being
shipwrecked.21 Did Dudley and Stephens deserve to be hanged as
murderers if they did not deviate from the standards of conduct of their
community? Or would the very existence and acceptance of survival
cannibalism demonstrate the need to use the criminal law-and the
executions of Dudley and Stephens---to eradicate that custom?
Many students take the latter utilitarian view. Unsympathetic to
Dudley and Stephens and hostile to survival cannibalism, they strongly
favor using the criminal law to eradicate the practice. Others, more
sympathetic, favor the notion that the proper role for the criminal law in
a democracy is to reflect rather than to shape community standards.
Susan Estrich's book, chapters of which the students will read toward
the end of the semester, raises precisely the same issue, but in a context
which brings the question much closer to home for students. Rather than
human sacrifice, the attitudes in question deal with standards of
appropriate sexual interaction. Estrich wants to use criminal law to
create non-sexist social attitudes toward sexual interaction. In support
of her position, she analogizes to late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century judges who hanged "gentlemen of quality" in order to change
social attitudes toward dueling. 22 But she could as easily have
analogized to hanging Dudley and Stephens in order to change attitudes
toward survival cannibalism.
When I cover Dudley & Stephens, I make no explicit reference to rape
law. I simply highlight the issue of the proper relationship between
criminal law and public attitudes. Sometimes I keep track of the
positions students take on the question whether criminal law should
reflect or shape social attitudes toward survival cannibalism. These rarely
break down along gender lines. When we reach rape law, I ask students
to compare their views about the appropriate role of criminal law in the
context of Dudley & Stephens with their views on this same issue in the
context of date rape raised in Estrich's book.

21. Historical support for the conditions I pose hypothetically can be found in
A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW (1984) and Michael G.
M,t:lin, In Warm Blood: Some Historical and Procedural Aspects of Regina v. Dudley
and Stephens, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 387 (1967).
22. REAL RAPE, supra note 6, at 101-02.
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Early in the semester, I have the class take a number of statutes and
break them down into their component elements.23 I regularly include
rape in this exercise. In my coverage of mens rea, I use the examples of
homicide and rape to show how the reach of a criminal statute can be
expanded or contracted by altering the culpability assigned to a particular
element. I include rape in these basic analytical exercises in order to get
students used to encountering and talking about rape law in what is
likely to be a low volatility setting and to help them achieve a clearer
understanding of the technical aspects of rape law through repeated
exposure.
For example, many students have difficulty grasping the concept of
'negligent rape' they will encounter in the chapter I assign from
Professor Estrich's book. Without a clear understanding of how such a
crime is defined, these students will not be able to understand or discuss
the policy issues it raises. The source of the problem is usually a failure
to distinguish between a defendant's state of mind regarding the act of
sexual intercourse and his . state of mind regarding the attendant
circumstance of lack of consent. Some students intuitively link
culpability in the context of rape only with conduct and, consequently,
find it difficult to imagine how a man could engage in sexual intercourse
with any mental state other than purpose. How then, they ask, can one
negligently rape? Because I have previously illustrated both the
elements of a criminal statute and the function of mens rea with the
example of rape, when we reach the concept of negligence in rape law,
most students clearly understand the difference between assigning
culpability to the circumstance element of a crime as opposed to the act.
The law of homicide provides a number of such opportunities to lay
a conceptual groundwork for rape law. The difficulties of proving a
defendant's mental state, of grading offenses, and of distinguishing
behaviors suitable for criminal sanction from those suitable for civil
sanction or no legal sanction are common both to rape and homicide.
Since homicide and rape are two of the most serious offenses in the
hierarchy of crimes, students find it quite natural to compare how the
law relating to each crime treats similar issues. And the comparison
prompts students to integrate different topics within the course.

23. KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 213-14 provides an assortment of
non-rape statutes for such an exercise.
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A general debate on the pros and cons of objective and subjective
culpability requirements provides another opportunity early in the course
to lay groundwork useful later in covering rape. During this debate, I
simply pose the question whether the crime of rape should require
objective or subjective culpability, and ask the students to think about
that issue in anticipation of further discussion later in the semester.
When we cover the grading of homicide based on culpability, I ask
whether or not a similar grading scheme would be appropriate for rape
and again ask the students simply to think about it in preparation for
future classes on rape. My aims here are to aid comprehension through
repeated exposure and to generate student responses that are thoughtful,
measured, and likely to integrate rape into the general themes of the
criminal law course.
Homicide law's treatment of common issues provides useful comparison points to which the instructor can refer in guiding classroom
discussion of rape law. On the question of whether lesser offenses in a
rape law grading scheme should be called "rape" rather than "gross
sexual imposition" or "unlawful sexual intercourse,"24 for example, the
professor can refer back to the Model Penal Code's use of "negligent
homicide," 25 a relatively bland term in comparison with words such as
"murder" and "manslaughter," for the lowest crime in its homicide
hierarchy. This sort of reference back to homicide law provides a
mechanism for responding to students such as those described by
Professor Tomkovicz who are unwilling to advance the arguments on all
sides of an issue in rape law reform. 26 Professor Tomkovicz, for
example, explains that students "refrain from defending" the controversial decision in Regina v. Morgan, 27 that requires subjective culpability
in rape, leaving him to present arguments in its support.28 Referring
students back to homicide law's preference for subjective culpability29
and the rationales for that preference and asking them to reconcile

24. See infra text accompanying notes 47-50.
25. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES§ 210.4 (1980).
26. See Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 489 n.25 ("It is increasingly the case that
student distaste and fear hinder the development of all sides of a controversial issue such
as the spousal exemption.").
27. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan, House of Lords [1975] A.C. 182.
28. Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 495 n.39.
29. The Model Penal Code, for example, requires either purely or partially
subjective culpability (purpose, knowledge, or extreme recklessness) for murder and
requires partially subjective culpability (recklessness) for manslaughter. Only in its
lowest grade of homicide, negligent homicide, does the Model Penal Code entirely reject
subjective culpability, and even there it insists on gross negligence and tailors the
negligence standard to "the actor's situation." MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES §§ 2.02(2)(d), 210 (1980).
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rejection of subjective culpability in rape with homicide's reliance on it
gives the professor a means of getting students to confront the arguments
in favor of subjective culpability without having to advance those
arguments explicitly herself.
Earlier parts of the course also offer opportunities for the instructor to
challenge student assumptions about the instructor's views on rape
issues. "Students may assume, for example, that female faculty
members will prove sympathetic only to certain views and unsympathetic
to opposing views, and students may hold correspondingly opposite
assumptions for male faculty members."30 One way to deal with such
assumptions is simply to address them directly. 31 Another method is
actively to raise arguments early in the course from a point of view
inconsistent with the students' likely assumptions about the instructor.
Including rape among the crimes used in the early exercise of breaking
down statutes into their component elements, for example, requires
students to address how to describe the conduct required for conviction
of rape. Many statutory formulations, such as the Model Penal Code's,
use the phrase "sexual intercourse" to describe the required conduct. 32
This exercise gives a male instructor the opportunity to raise a feminist
perspective on the adequacy of the phrase "sexual intercourse" to
describe the actus reus in rape. The word "sexual" seems inappropriate,
the instructor may argue, because rape "is not, from the victim's
perspective, about sex but about violation."33 And the word "intercourse" suggests mutuality, something that happens between people,
while rape, like assault, seems more accurately described as something
that one person does to another.
The provocation doctrine provides another opportunity for a male
instructor to dissipate student assumptions about the instructor's
sympathies. When I cover provocation, I focus on whether the law
should recognize provocation as a mitigating factor in homicide. The
instructor can challenge the provocation doctrine by making the

30. Bloch, supra note 3, at 315.
31. For discussion and examples of directly addressing the issue of stereotyping,
see Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz, "A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason":
Toward Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773, 1795-96 (1993).
32. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES art. 213 (1980).
33. Mary I. Coombs, Non-sexist Teaching Techniques in Substantive Law Courses,
14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 507, 521 {1990).
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observation that it is typically men, not women, who benefit from the
provocation doctrine and then forcefully asking why the provocation
doctrine is not simply a manifestation of sexism in the law, reinforcing
precisely what the criminal law should be working to eradicate, the
acceptance of male violence against women. 34
·
In the last several pages, I have suggested the advantages of using the
parts of a criminal law course which precede primary coverage of rape
law to take the offensive by anticipating and defusing classroom
problems. Such proactive measures pose some risks as well as
advantages. If there are rape survivors in the class, early references to
rape law may catch them off guard and subject them to more discomfort
than they would experience if rape law discussions were confined
exclusively to one segment of the course. 35 The instructor might reduce
this risk by informing the class on the first day that rape will be one of
the many crimes used illustratively in the first part of the course.

Ill.

JURY NULLIFICATION PROBLEM AND ROLE PLAY36

I usually devote four class hours to the exclusive treatment of rape
law. As with every other subject covered in the course, the assignment
for each class is set forth in a syllabus along with a set of questions to
help students prepare. In the area of rape in particular, the practice of
34. KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 413-14 include in their materials on
provocation a note raising this issue and an excerpt from JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 193-94 (1992) which articulates this perspective on the
provocation doctrine. Several readers of drafts of this article suggested I include
examples of opportunities for a female instructor to counter likely gender-based
assumptions about her sympathies. Since I obviously cannot . speak from personal
experience, I hesitate to offer such advice. But two possibilities occur to me and I offer
them simply as untested suggestions. If she uses the Kadish & Schulhofer text, a female
instructor might, during a class session dealing with the arguments for and against
recognizing a defense of provocation, prompt a student to articulate a feminist view of
the law of provocation by referring specifically to the Jeremy Horder excerpt previously
cited and asking the students what view on provocation that excerpt expresses. The
female instructor could then draw on the portion of the reading supportive of the
provocation doctrine to pose questions that challenge the position expressed by Horder.
Another possibility during the actual coverage of rape law might be for a female
instructor to take the lead in articulating parts of Katie Roiphe' s critical analysis of some
feminist views on rape law. See KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND
FEMINISM ON CAMPUS (1993). For discussion and examples of other methods of
countering gender-based assumptions about the instructor, see Bloch, supra note 3, at
315 n.49; Harris & Schultz, supra note 31, at 1795.
35. See Amanda Konradi, Teaching About Sexual Assault: Problematic Silences
and Solutions, 21 TEACHING Soc. 13, 14 (1993).
36. I am indebted to Professor Catherine Hancock for the suggestion of using the
Kalven & Zeiseljury study, infra note 37, and combining it with a role play to introduce
students to the topic of rape. See supra note 5.
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providing questions in advance produces more thoughtful and measured
comments in class.
The first assignment in the ·area of rape, along with some material
from the casebook, is a chapter from Kalven and Zeisel's The American
Jury, entitled "Contributory Fault of the Victim,"37 which I place on
library reserve. The theme of this chapter is the jury's tendency to
"bootleg" civil concepts of contributory fault and assumption of risk into
criminal cases despite the fact that criminal law in theory treats both as
irrelevant. The chapter describes cases that concern a wide range of
property crimes and crimes of violence in which the jury tends to assess
the morality of both male and female crime victims and, if the victim is
viewed as being in some way at fault, either refuses to convict or
reduces the level of conviction.
The rape cases recounted in this chapter are particularly disturbing
because of the frequency and degree of nullification as well as the jury's
views of what constitutes fault on the part of a rape victim. One matter,
for example, was described by the judge as "a savage case of rape" in
which the "[j]aw of [the] complaining witness [was] fractured in two
places."38 The jury acquitted entirely after it learned that the victim
may have consented to intercourse on prior occasions and that the victim
and defendant "went out together on several occasions and on the
evening in question had been drinking." 39 Kalven and Zeisel tell of
another case in which "three men kidnap a girl from the street at 1:30
in the morning, take her to an apartment, and attack her.',4() The jury
acquitted when it learned that the victim had two illegitimate children
and the defendant claimed she was a prostitute.41 Kalven and Zeisel
conclude with the following summary of juror attitudes:
Where it perceives an assumption of risk the jury, if given the option of finding
the defendant guilty of a lesser crime, will frequently do so. It is thus saying

37. HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 242-57 (1966).
Because the Kalven & Zeisel study was done in 1966, I supplement it with some more
current handouts showing the persistence of the problem of jury nullification in rape
cases. For a sociological source that updates the Kalven & Zeisel study, see GARY D.
LAFREE, Jurors' Responses to

JUSTICE
38.
39.
40.
41.

Victims' Behavior in Rape Trials, in RAPE AND CRIMINAL

200-33 (1989).
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 37, at 251.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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not that the defendant has done nothing, but rather that what he has done does
not deserve the distinctive opprobrium of rape. If forced to choose in these
cases between total acquittal and finding the defendant guilty of rape, the jury
will usually choose acquittal as the lesser evil.42

This reading assignment provides the basis for role plays in which the
students put themselves in the position first of judge and then of
legislator confronted with jury nullification. The role play is assigned
with the following instructions, given both orally in class and in writing
in the syllabus:
To prepare for class:
Focus in particular on pages 249-254 of the Kalven and Zeisel excerpt,
dealing with the jury's handling of rape cases. Why did the juries in these
cases apparently apply standards other than those set forth in the substantive
law of rape? Does the problem lie with the jury? With the way the crime of
rape is defined? With the procedural or evidentiary rules used in rape cases?
If you were the judge in a rape case, what could you do to make a rebellious
jury follow the law of rape? What if you were a legislator? Would you need
to change the definition of rape? The rules of evidence? The rules of criminal
procedure? All three? Does the opinion in Chaney43 reflect an attitude similar
to that of the jurors in the Kalven and Zeisel study?

This reading assignment and its associated role play have a number of
advantages. When the topic is rape, the sort of general open-ended
questions professors frequently use to introduce new topics in a
course44 may meet with "deafening, uncomfortable silence from all in
attendance."45 Such seemingly innocuous open-ended questions as
"How should we define rape?" or "What problems do you think exist in
the area of rape law?" may seem to students to require risky selfrevelation. The Kalven and Zeisel reading is an effective tool to get
students past initial awkwardness about a volatile subject. It provides
concrete, memorable empirical data to engage student interest and
provide a comfortable way to start the class discussion. It allows the
instructor to begin by asking students a simple series of descriptive
questions about the juror conduct and attitudes revealed in the reading.
My experience has been that students do not hesitate to volunteer
answers to such questions, and that once that discussion is under way,
I can move fairly easily to the topic of possible responses to the problem
42. Id. at 254 (footnote omitted).
43. State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441 (1970), is an Alaska Supreme Court rape case
dealing with sentencing. The opinion refers to the victim having "voluntarily entered
appellee's car" as a "mitigating circumstance." Id. at 446-47. Excerpts from the opinion
are found in KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 140-42.
44. See Tornkovicz, supra note 1, at 486-87 ("I inquired of the class how they
would, if they could, define the category of behavior to be criminalized as rape.").
45. Id.
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of nullification. Exploring the advantages and disadvantages of these
responses allows an easy transition to core nonnative issues of rape law
with little risk of "explosion."
As the classroom discussion develops, both the Kalven and Zeisel
reading and the role plays allow students to distance themselves from the
subject and so reduce their vulnerability. Rather than talk directly about
their own attitudes or those of other members of the class, students can
talk about juror attitudes and values. Similarly, in role play, rather than
give their own responses to jury nullification, students can give the
responses of an imagined judge or legislator.
This approach reduces both pressure on the women in the class to
initiate a critique of how rape law functions in our society, and the risk
that members of the class will discount concerns about rape law because
of a lack of empirical support. The Kalven and Zeisel reading initiates
a critique of rape law with clear and quite dramatic empirical data which
are hard not to take seriously. This approach also works against gender
polarization because the role plays tend to unify the class by focusing
student attention on the common problem of reining in the rebellious
jury.
After the Kalven and Zeisel reading, I tum to materials in the
casebook which address what elements should be included in the
definition of the crime of rape. I devote the last part of the class on the
Kalven and Zeisel material and the entire next class to this topic. The
Kalven and Zeisel reading works nicely both to introduce and to focus
coverage of rape law doctrine. One issue to discuss is whether changes
in the substantive formulation of the crime of rape will be an effective
cure for the jury's tendency to put the rape victim's conduct on trial.
The Model Penal Code, for example, uses a force, threat, or deception
requirement in lieu of lack of consent in the hope of keeping the jury's
focus on the defendant rather than the victim. 46 Another topic easily
.raised is whether it helps to add various gradations to the offense of rape
in response to the jury's desire, described in Kalven and Zeisel, to find
the defendant guilty of some lesser offense which does not carry "the
distinctive opprobrium of rape',47 and whether the lesser crimes in such

46. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 213.1 and Comment to
§ 213.1 at 274-356 (1980).
47. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 37, at 254.
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a grading hierarchy should carry the name "rape"48 or some less
'opprobrious' name, such as the Model Penal Code's "gross sexual
imposition"49 or Delaware's "unlawful sexual intercourse."50 The
downside to a statute with gradations of rape and to the use of words
other than rape to name lower gradations is the risk of reducing the
seriousness of the · crime, a point which ties in nicely to Professor
Estrich's emphasis, which students will encounter two classes later, on
the importance of viewing simple rape as "real rape."
In future classes, I intend to make the legislative role play more
formal and adopt a number of the measures Professor Bloch uses in her
"student-as-legislator" approach, such as having groups of students
collaboratively draft rape statutes and debate the pros and cons of
various proposals using visual aids to track the differences in statutory
language. The active nature of the drafting exercise and group collaboration are appealing as effective countermeasures to the risk of silencing.
The goal of persuading other legislators to adopt one's own viewpoint
should also help encourage sensitivity in speaking and thus dampen
volatility. And the task of actually drafting a criminal statute seems an
excellent pedagogical exercise for capping off a course focused on
critiquing criminal legislation and helping students appreciate the
difficulties of legislative drafting.

IV. A

TRANSUBSTANTIVE LEGISLATNE

Focus

In a first-year criminal law course, the focal point is naturally the
substantive criminal law defined by legislatures, and interpreted and
applied by courts. I emphasize at several points in my course the close
connection between substantive criminal law and the law of evidence
and procedure, and encourage students to include a transubstantive
dimension in their thinking about criminal law problems. In teaching
strict liability, for example, an instructor can examine the substantive/procedural hybrid of negligence and shifting the burden of proof to
the defendant as an alternative to strict liability. 51 When covering

48. Washington, for example, uses the word "rape" in the lesser crimes in its rape
grading hierarchy. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.44.060 (West 1988) ("rape in the
third degree").
49. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Comment to § 213.1 at 354 (1980).
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 773 (1995); Wisconsin uses the term "sexual
assault," WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(3) (West 1996).
51. The Supreme Court of Canada addressed this alternative to strict liability in
Regina v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 R.C.S. 1299.
There has . . . been an attempt in Australia, in many Canadian Courts, and
indeed in England, to seek a middle position [between full mens rea and
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felony murder, an instructor can again look at the interplay of substance
and procedure by discussing the criticism that the felony murder rule
undermines the procedural protection of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
by effectively eliminating that requirement in regard to culpability,
typically an essential element of a crime as serious as murder. 5
The same transubstantive method works well for teaching rape law,
which lends itself readily to consideration of legal areas outside
substantive criminal law. 53 In introducing the role play, I explicitly
direct the students to consider, as judges and legislators trying to remedy
jury nullification in rape, whether they need to change the definition of
rape, the rules of evidence, the rules of criminal procedure, or some
combination of these. 54 By including evidentiary and procedural
dimensions in the role play, rather than merely raising them during class
discussion, the instructor makes students conscious of these dimensions
before they do the reading assignments so that they can think about them
in preparation for class.
We focus for an entire class period on how the rules of evidence may
be used to respond to the nullification problem. For that class, I assign
the casebook materials that deal with cross-examination and rape
shield. 55 I supplement these with problems and materials I use on the
topic of rape shield in my evidence course.
We also discuss various ways in which procedural rules might be used
to stop jury nullification in rape cases, although I do not make. this the

absolute liability], fulfilling the goals of public welfare offences while still not
punishing the entirely blameless. There is an increasing and impressive stream
of authority which holds that where an offence does not require full mens rea,
it is nevertheless a good defence for the defendant to prove that he was not
negligent ....
Id.
This case is included in KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 250-52. The Model
Penal Code uses a similar substantive/procedural hybrid in some statutory rape situations.
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 213.6(1) (1980) ("When criminality
depends on the child's being below a critical age other than 10, it is a defense for the
actor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he reasonably believed the child
to be above the critical age.").
52. See George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 Sw. U. L. REv. 413,
427-29 (1981); Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine
at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446 (1985).
53. Bloch, supra note 3, at 337.
54. See supra Part III.
55. KADISH AND SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 372-84.

535

topic of a separate class. Rather, I deal with possible procedural
responses at various points in the classes devoted to the substantive
definition and grading of rape. A question often encountered in these
classes is whether focusing on the victim rather than the defendant in
rape cases is attributable to criminal procedural rules such as the
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. If so, how should one deal with this problem? Some
students have proposed shifting the burden of proof on the consent
element to the defendant, perhaps with a lower culpability such as
negligence, an idea drawn from earlier treatment of strict liability. Some
have also suggested supplementing criminal sanctions with civil
theories56 which would reduce procedural obstacles, give the victim
more control over the initiation and subsequent course of the legal
action, and perhaps reduce the jury's reluctance to sanction the
defendant, an idea drawn from earlier class discussion about whether
negligent homicide is better treated by criminal or civil sanctions.

V.

ESTRICH READING

Another reading assignment in my syllabus, usually for the last class
on rape law, is comprised of the first and last chapters from Susan
Estrich's Real Rape,57 which I place on library reserve. In the first
chapter, entitled "My Story," Professor Estrich tells of her own rape and
provides an overview of current legal problems in the area of rape from
her perspective as both a victim and an academic. I intend to move this
chapter into one of the earlier reading assignments on rape, perhaps
immediately after the Kalven and Zeisel assignment, in order to expose
students earlier to a victim's viewpoint on rape and also to take
advantage of Estrich's overview of rape law doctrine.
In her last chapter, "New Answers," Professor Estrich advances
various reform proposals, including the enactment of a crime of
negligent rape in which the "reasonable man" used to assess a
defendant's negligence would be one who takes a woman's words and
conduct seriously, and understands that "no" means "no," not "maybe."
56. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 includes a civil damage action for
victims of gender-motivated violence, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). Federal courts which
have considered challenges to this provision have reached different conclusions on its
constitutionality. Compare Michael D. Shear, Judge Rejects U.S. Law for Abuse Victims;
Allowing Women to Sue Ruled Unconstitutional, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 30, 1996,
at Al (describing recent decision of U.S. District Court in Virginia finding the provision
unconstitutional) with Jane Doe v. John Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996)
(provision found constitutional).
57. REAL RAPE, supra note 6.
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This year I supplemented this chapter with a six-page excerpt from
Lawrence Friedman's Crime and Punishment in American History 58
which deals with the historical development of rape law in the twentieth
century. The Friedman reading works well with the other reading
materials since it discusses both the Kalven and Zeisel jury study59 and
Professor Estrich's work. 60 One reason I include this excerpt is to
provide students an historical context within which to place Estrich's
writing. 61 Another reason is to weaken the tendency of some students
to dismiss Estrich's arguments as lacking objectivity because she is a
rape victim and a feminist. Friedman reinforces the historical need for
rape law reform and adds diversity to the reading by providing a male
voice sympathetic to reform.
Although I have had some concern about how a class would respond
to the Estrich reading, it has worked well in my classes, often generating
intense but useful discussion. Estrich's comments and critique are
concise, concrete, forceful and accessible. They engage students and
coordinate well with the other course materials on rape law. Estrich
describes, for example, Kalven and Zeisel's findings on rape cases and
discusses several of the rape cases in the casebook, including Regina v.

Morgan. 62
Rather than cause classroom explosions, the Estrich reading has
generated discussions which deal not only with gender differences, but
also the major issues in criminal law. By the time they reach the law of
rape, my students usually have ready access to a range of viewpoints
they can bring to bear on Estrich's proposals. These include the proper
role of criminal law in society, the tension between using criminal law
to serve a broad social purpose and doing justice to an individual
defendant, the debate over objective and subjective culpability standards,
the limits of the criminal sanction, and the interaction between substance
and procedure. In my view, these other axes of discussion successfully
balance and contain gender polarization.

58. Lawrence M. Friedman, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 42934 (1993).
59. Id. at 431.
60. Id.
61. Another useful source for a concise historical overview is DEBORAH L. RHODE,
JUSTICE AND GENDER 244-53 (1989).
62. See supra note 27.
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A good example of a recurring criminal law issue that Estrich's
writings may be used to explore is the question whether and to what
degree objective standards of liability should be 'individualized.' The
instructor can raise this issue early in the course by considering the
Model Penal Code's definition of negligence, which bases the determination of what is reasonable on the viewpoint of "a reasonable person
. . . in the actor's situation. "63 What characteristics fall within the
phrase "the actor's situation"-physical handicap, ethnic origin, religion,
social beliefs about sexual interaction-is a question which recurs
throughout the course. 64 In the law of homicide, for example, should
the standard of reasonable provocation be tailored to include factors such
as age,65 intelligence,66 or alcoholism?67
Should the negligence
standard in homicide reflect the education and medical sophistication of
the parents?68 Should Christian Science parents whose refusal of
treatment for a child results in death be judged by what a reasonable
Christian Scientist parent would do? 69
As noted previously, Estrich argues that reasonableness in rape should
be judged from the viewpoint of a non-sexist reasonable man "who
understands that a woman's word is deserving of respect."70 But a
defendant in a rape case might claim that he should be judged by what
appears "reasonable" from an admittedly sexist viewpoint, especially if
many others, perhaps a majority, in his community share such sexist
attitudes towards norms of sexual interaction and sexual mores are in
transition. 71 Exploring the issue of whether the reasonable man

63. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(d) (1980) (emphasis
added).
64. For a recent treatment of this issue, see Doriane L. Coleman, Individualizing
Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberal 's Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093
(1996).
65. See Director of Public Prosecution v. Camplin, 2 All E.R. 168 (1978).
66. See Regina v. Raven, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 51.
67. See Regina v. Newell, 71 Crim. App. Rep. 331 (1980).
68. See State v. Williams, 4 Wash. App. 908, 484 P.2d 1167 (1971).
69. See Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852 (1988).
70. REAL RAPE, supra note 6, at 97.
71. On the prevalence of sexist attitudes in society, Estrich notes:
Women as well as men have viewed male aggressiveness as desirable and
forced sex as an expression of love. Women as well as men have been taught
and come to believe that if a woman "encourages" a man, he is entitled to
sexual satisfaction. Or, as Ann Landers put it in 1985, "the someone who
'repairs to some private place for a few drinks and a little shared affection'
has, by her acceptance of such a cozy invitation, given the man reason to
believe she is a candidate for whatever he might have in mind." From
sociological surveys to prime-time television, one can find ample support in
our society and culture for even the broadest notions of seduction enforced by
the most traditional judges.
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standard should be tailored in rape to incorporate a non-sexist or sexist
viewpoint provides an excellent opportunity to revisit the issue raised in
Dudley & Stephens of whether criminal law should reflect or shape
community standards. It also makes for an engaging way to recap and
enliven the individualization issue toward the end of the course and
encourage students to integrate their responses to this issue in a variety
of criminal contexts.
Finally, I attempt during my criminal law class to expose students to
critiques of criminal law from a variety of perspectives, such as law and
economics and critical legal studies. Usually time constraints limit us to
reading brief excerpts in the casebook or having me raise a perspective
in class without the benefit of background reading. The Estrich chapters
give the students exposure to an accessible feminist critique of criminal
law in its original form and in more detail than a typical brief excerpt
in a casebook.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The approach I describe in this essay provides a less formal, less
elaborate alternative to Professor Bloch's methodology, while still
offering some of the advantages of a role play to teach rape law. Some
facets of the approach described herein could also easily be integrated
into Professor Bloch's "student-as-legislator" method. The proactive
anticipatory measures and the Kalven and Zeisel jury study would work
well to set up her drafting exercise and the Estrich reading could be used
as a follow-up, allowing students to compare their proposals with
Estrich's reform measures.
As I mentioned at the outset, Catherine Hancock's sharing of her ideas
on how to teach rape law greatly improved my criminal law class by

But the evidence is not entirely one-sided. College men and women may
think that the typical male is forward and primarily interested in sex, but they
no longer conclude that he is the desirable man. Older sex manuals may have
lauded male sexual responses as automatic and uncontrollable, but some of the
newer ones no longer see men as machines and even advocate sensitivity as
seductive. Date rape is beginning to be thought of as just that, by its women
victims and by those in positions of authority on college campuses.
We live in a time of changing sexual mores, and we are likely to for some
time to come.
Id. at 100-01.
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prodding me into including the subject of rape law. I am sure Professor
Bloch's article will have the same effect on many criminal law teachers.
I hope this essay will also provide similar encouragement as well as
prompt further discussion and improvement of the teaching of rape law.
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